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In crafting the United States Constitution, the framers recognized the vital importance of 
innovation with respect to the success and longevity of our nation.1  The United States remains 
among the top global innovators, but that does not mean our nation is free of issues related to 
technological innovation.2  In the modern era, technology pervades nearly every aspect of society 
from the economy to education and even national security, as depicted by the current technological 
arms race between the United States and other nations.3  But apart from global threats to our 
nation’s innovation, such as intellectual property theft and technological arms races,4 the last 
decade has introduced internal concerns that may threaten our current innovative landscape, 
specifically with respect to the patent process.5  
While contemporary technology has come an incredibly long way since our nation’s 
beginning, the constitutional goal of patent law remains the same—to promote the useful arts by 
 
* Seton Hall University School of Law – J.D. Candidate. University of Rhode Island – Doctor of Pharmacy (Pharm.D.). 
1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
2 CORNELL UNIV., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. (WIPO), & INSTITUT EUROPÉEN D’ADMINISTRATION DES 
AFFAIRES (INSEAD), GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX (GII) 2019 RANKINGS (2019), 
https://www.wipo.int/publications/en/details.jsp?id=4434. 
3 Press Release, Tillis and Coons: What We Learned at Patent Reform Hearings [hereinafter What We Learned at 
Patent Reform Hearings] (Jun. 24, 2019), https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/6/tillis-and-coons-what-we-learned-at-
patent-reform-hearings (“[I]nventions deemed eligible today drive tomorrow’s jobs, national competitiveness, 
economic prosperity, and even national security.”); See Program synopsis, Richard Nixon Found., An Emerging 
Technological Arms Race (Jul. 13, 2018), https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2018/08/synopsis-emerging-
technological-arms-race/. 
4 See GRANT CLARK, What is Intellectual Property, and does China Steal It?, BLOOMBERG (last updated Jan. 21, 
2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-05/what-s-intellectual-property-and-does-china-steal-it-
quicktake; Press Release, Senator Thom Tillis, Sens. Tillis and Reps. Collins, Johnson, and Stivers Release Draft Bill 
Text to Reform Section 101 of the Patent Act (May 22, 2019) [hereinafter Tillis Draft Bill], 
https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/5/sens-tillis-and-coons-and-reps-collins-johnson-and-stivers-release-draft-bill-
text-to-reform-section-101-of-the-patent-act. 
5 See GENE QUINN, Did the Supreme Court Intentionally Destroy the U.S. Patent System?, IP WATCHDOG (May 22, 
2018) [hereinafter Did the Supreme Court Destroy Patents], https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/05/22/did-the-
supreme-court-intentionally-destroy-the-u-s-patent-system/id=97514/ (highlighting the current section 101 
atmosphere and its negative impact on innovation); RYAN DAVIS, Experts Look to Congress to Stem Patent-eligibility 
‘Chaos,’ LAW360 (April 20, 2018, 7:14 PM EDT) (regarding innovators threatening to leave the U.S.). 
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balancing inventor incentives against the liberal use of increasingly accessible information.6  That 
being said, modern innovation has introduced challenges in interpreting and applying the law.  One 
such challenge has been the application of section 101 of the Patent Act, which establishes 
patentable subject matter,7 or in other words, what things can be patented, to the rapidly advancing 
fields of medicine and computer science.8  The literal text of section 101 allows for the patenting 
of any “useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof.”9  In addition to the statutory language, the courts created judicial exceptions 
to these categories which bar the patenting of laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract 
ideas.10  In response to this hurdle, the Supreme Court developed a test, known as the “Alice/Mayo 
Test,”11 which has led various players of the current patent-law paradigm to reach conflicting 
conclusions and has produced troubling results for the last decade.12  For instance, the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has rejected a majority of recent medical diagnostic because of 
ineligible subject matter.13  Even the Federal Circuit voiced its concern over the current test for 
subject matter eligibility, but nonetheless felt constrained by Supreme Court precedent.14  This 
 
6 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 92 (2012) (explaining 
how patent rights seek to promote invention without excessively limiting the flow of information). 
7 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). 
8 See JOHN M. GOLDEN ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, at 65 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 
7th ed. 2018) (“Questions of . . . subject-matter eligibility have proven particularly significant for the patenting of . . . 
key subject matter for innovation in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, information and communications 
technologies, and finance.”). 
9 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
10 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). 
11 See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73 (establishing a test for determining whether a process incorporates a law of nature in 
a manner that warrants patentability); Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 209 (2014) (extending 
this test to abstract ideas). 
12 Did the Supreme Court Destroy Patents, supra note 5. 
13 GENE QUINN, It May Be Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit, IP WATCHDOG (Jul. 9, 2019), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/07/09/may-time-abolish-federal-circuit/id=111122/ (“If the Federal Circuit is 
going to . . . kill . . . virtually all of the medical diagnostic patents, what role does the federal circuit really play?”). 
14 See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Linn, J., concurring) (“But 
for the sweeping language in the Supreme Court’s Mayo opinion, I see no reason, in policy or statute, why this 
breakthrough invention should be deemed patent ineligible.”). 
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uncertainty and unpredictability has reaching effects on our nation as a whole.15  Accordingly, 
there have been multiple proposed solutions including administrative guidance, institutional 
reform, and most recently, a proposed congressional reform of section 101 of the Patent Act 
itself.16 
When evaluating the recent congressional reform in particular, it is important to analyze 
the potential judicial reaction to the new statutory language.  Focusing on the courts posits a 
number of questions with respect to the future of section 101.  How will the courts respond to the 
potential section 101 reform?  Will the reform ultimately produce a change in overall patentability 
of software and biotechnological innovations?  Do the courts have other, perhaps more appropriate 
options to consider in addressing their current concerns?  This comment investigates these 
questions and ultimately concludes that the congressional reform has the potential to resolve the 
major section 101 issues but is unlikely to produce any dramatic shift in overall patentability.   
Section II will provide a review of the current state of subject matter eligibility and its 
flaws.  Section III will analyze the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s (PTO) recent 
attempt to remedy the current disarray.  Section IV will discuss the recent draft bill proposed to 
reform section 101.  Section V will explore the reforms weaknesses and argue that, although the 
draft bill is unlikely to actually produce any sweeping changes in overall patentability, it is still a 




15 See Tillis Draft Bill, supra note 4 (discussing the impact intellectual property has on our economy, research and 
development, and international intellectual property theft). 
16 See, e.g., UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, DOCKET NO. PTO-P-2018-0053, 2019 REVISED 
PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE (2019) [hereinafter USPTO Guidance] (administrative approach); 
Tillis Draft Bill, supra note 4 (statutory approach); Kristen Osenga, Article: Institutional Design for Innovation: A 
Radical Proposal for Addressing § 101 Patent-eligible Subject Matter, 68 AM. U.L. REV. 1191 (2019) [hereinafter 
Osenga, Institutional Reform] (institutional approach). 
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II. The Current State of Patent Subject Matter Eligibility 
The evolution of subject matter eligibility jurisprudence warrants review in order to 
illustrate the courts role with regard to the current chaos in the field.  But before delving into the 
case law, it is important to recognize the statutory background and requirements of patentability.  
Once this foundation is established, the current state of subject matter eligibility and its issues will 
be explored. 
A. Statutory Sources of Patent Subject Matter Eligibility 
 Congressional power to regulate patents derives from Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the 
Constitution, which grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the . . . useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective . . . Discoveries.”17  When 
Congress passed the Patent Act of 1952 it not only codified existing law into the sections used 
today, but also responded to, and overruled, some of the Court’s case law.18  Section 101 of the 
Patent Act establishes statutory subject matter eligibility, as well as the utility requirement, and 
simply provides, “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a 
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”19  While section 101 lies 
at the heart of the current subject matter eligibility debacle, it is important to recognize the other 
requirements of patentability, namely that an invention be novel,20 not obvious or 
“nonobviousness” to a person skilled in the relevant field,21 and adequately disclosed in the patent 
 
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, Cl 8.  
18 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2011); JOHN M. GOLDEN ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
11 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 7th ed. 2018) (noting, inter alia, how “section 112 overturned the invalidation of “means 
plus function” claims and section 103 regarding Nonobviousness supplanted “the ‘flash of genius’ test”). 
19 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). 
20 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (requiring that an invention be novel in relation to prior art). 
21 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2011) (requiring that an invention be non-obvious or significantly different from the prior art). 
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specification.22  In addition to these statutory sources, the Court has developed a great deal of 
section 101 doctrine in the last decade, which some refer to as the “federal common law of 
patents.”23 
B. Judicially Created Subject Matter Eligibility Doctrine 
 Given section 101’s relatively succinct guidance, the courts have used the relevant 
constitutional language in conjunction with section 101 to find implicit limitations on patent 
eligible subject matter.24  For instance, in the early 1980’s the Court established what may be the 
most influential judicial exception to subject matter eligibility by holding that “laws of nature, 
natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas” cannot be patented.25  Although the text of section 101 
fails to mention laws of nature or abstract ideas whatsoever, the Court used the underlying 
constitutional goal of balancing incentives to innovate against restrictions on further innovation to 
reach the conclusion that laws of nature should be off limits.26  But as the Court has recognized, 
such a rule is complicated by the fact that virtually every invention utilizes a law of nature or 
abstract idea to some extent.27  This intrinsic conflict has come to a head in the recent decade as 
courts have struggled to craft a reliable test to distinguish inventions that merely apply a judicial 
 
22 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring a written description, enablement, and best mode). 
23 Eric Guttag, Why is SCOTUS Creating a Federal Common Law of Patents, IP Watchdog (Dec. 10, 2018), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/12/10/scotus-federal-common-law-patents/id=103946/. 
24 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (using judicial reasoning to establish the policy that “laws of 
nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas” should not be patentable, despite the absence of such language in 
section 101, because patenting these exceptions would contravene the constitutional purpose of patent law). 
25 Id. See also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 477 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (suggesting that “[a]nything under the sun that is 
made by man” may be patented).  
26 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013) (“patent protection strikes a 
delicate balance between creating ‘incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery’ and ‘impeding the flow 
of information that might permit, indeed spur, invention.’”). 
27 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012) (“The Court has recognized, 
however, that too broad an interpretation of this exclusionary principle could eviscerate patent law. For all inventions 
at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”). 
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exception, and are therefore worthy of patent rights, from those that seek to monopolize the 
exception itself.28 
 The Court’s recently developed test for determining whether a process incorporates a 
judicial exception in a manner that warrants patentability has been the primary issue in the area of 
subject matter eligibility.29  This test, known as the “Alice/Mayo test,” originated in Mayo 
Collaborative Serv. Inc. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., which involved a patented process for 
optimizing the dose of thiopurine drugs used in treating autoimmune diseases.30  Essentially, the 
process involved giving the drug; drawing blood to determine metabolite levels; and then using 
these levels to determine whether the dosage should be maintained, increased, or decreased.31  The 
district court found the patented process invalid because it effectively claimed the natural law or 
phenomena that are “the correlations between thiopurine levels and the toxicity and efficacy of 
thiopurine drug dosages.”32  The Federal Circuit reversed, finding the patent claims valid because 
the steps involved transformation of the patient’s body or blood, in addition to the natural 
correlations.33  The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed, and remanded, explaining that the 
“machine or transformation test” used by the Federal Circuit was not a definitive test of eligibility, 
but only a helpful clue.34  Again, the Federal Circuit found the patent claims did not encompass a 
natural law and reaffirmed its earlier decision.35  Once again the Court granted certiorari and 
 
28 See id. at 77 (“If a law of nature is not patentable, then neither is a process reciting a law of nature, unless that 
process has additional features that provide practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed 
to monopolize the law of nature itself.”).  
29 See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, DOCKET NO. PTO-P-2018-0053, 2019 REVISED PATENT 
SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE (2019) [hereinafter USPTO Guidance] 50, 50 (“Properly applying the 
Alice/Mayo test in a consistent manner has proven to be difficult, and has caused uncertainty in this area of law.”). 
30 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73. 
31 Id. at 74–75. 
32 Id. at 76. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 76–77. 
35 Id. 
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created what is now known as the Alice/Mayo test,36 which is comprised of two steps and relates 
back to the long-held rationale for judicial exceptions in preventing broad preemption of future 
innovation.37  
Under the Alice/Mayo test a court first determines whether the claims at issue are directed 
to a judicial exception or patent ineligible concept.38  If the answer is yes, then the court must 
analyze the additional claim elements individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine 
whether these elements “transform the nature of the claim” into something patent eligible.39  The 
Supreme Court described the second step of this analysis as the search for an "inventive concept"—
an element or combination of elements that is "sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice 
amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself."40  The Court also 
emphasized that additional steps must be more than “well-understood, routine, conventional steps 
previously engaged in by scientists in the field.”41  Applying this test to the patent in Mayo, the 
Court found the claims invalid because they were directed to natural correlations and the 
conventional steps failed to transform the claim in a manner that warranted patentability.42 
In Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v CLS Bank Int’l the Court expanded the test established in Mayo 
by applying it to claims involving abstract ideas.43  Alice involved patents disclosing a “computer-
implemented scheme for mitigating ‘settlement risk’ by using a third-party intermediary.”44  The 
Court found the claims directed “to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement” and concluded 
 
36 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 76–77. 
37 Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc. 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 12, 2015) (“The Supreme Court has 
made clear that the principle of preemption is the basis for the judicial exceptions to patentability.”). 
38 Id. at 1375. 
39 Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79). 
40 Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72). 
41 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 67. 
42 Id. at 78. 
43 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 212 (2014). 
44 Id. 
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that requiring the use of a generic computer was insufficient to satisfy the second step of the Mayo 
analysis.45  Having failed the Mayo analysis, the Court held the patented claims invalid as covering 
ineligible subject matter.46  This decision’s incorporation of abstract ideas into the Mayo analysis 
brought the Alice/Mayo test to its current state.  
C. Issues with the Current Subject Matter Eligibility Paradigm 
 Unfortunately, applying this test to modern innovations has proven difficult, particularly 
in the biotechnology and computer science fields.47  Take Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc. for example.48  First, a split Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling that 
the claims to isolated DNA molecules covered ineligible subject matter, with each of the three 
judges analyzing the eligibility of the claims differently.49  Judge Lourie, writing for the court, 
based his determination on the premise that isolated DNA is chemically separated from its native 
element and is therefore a distinct chemical entity with a “markedly different chemical structure 
compared to native DNA.”50  Judge Lourie also gave weight to the PTO’s long-standing practice 
of finding isolated DNA molecules patent eligible.51   Judge Moore, concurring-in-part, agreed 
with Judge Lourie’s reasoning, but also asked whether the differences from natural form provided 
new utility that renders the new form markedly different.52  In contrast, Judge Bryson, dissenting 




47 See USPTO 2019 Guidance, supra note 29, at 50. (discussing how the PTO, courts, and patent stakeholders have 
expressed concern for the clarity and predictability of the Alice/Mayo test); Borella supra note Error! Bookmark 
not defined.. 
48 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
49 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
50 Id. at 1352–53. 
51 Id. at 1354–55 (“[O]ur decision that isolated DNA molecules are patent eligible comports with the longstanding 
practice of the PTO. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that changes from longstanding practice should come 
from congress, not the courts.”).  
52 Id. at 1365 (Moore, J., concurring). 
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equivalent to the native gene, despite being chemically extracted, and therefore did not deserve 
patent protection.53  Judge Bryson also disagreed with giving significant weight to the PTO’s 
practices54 and voiced preemptive concerns.55  Upon grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated 
the judgment and remanded the case to be considered in light of the Alice/Mayo test.56 
 On remand, the Federal Circuit considered the claims pertaining to the isolated DNA in 
light of the Mayo decision and reaffirmed their finding of patent eligibility with each Judge 
reiterating their earlier reasoning.57  Once again, the Supreme Court took the case, this time 
addressing the Judges’ reasoning.58  In respect to the claims covering the isolated DNA, the Court 
held “that genes and the information they encode are not patent eligible under § 101 simply because 
they have been isolated from the surrounding genetic material.”59  The Court construed the claims 
as focusing on the genetic information encoded in the isolated molecule, rather than the chemical 
composition of the molecule itself, and rejected the idea that isolating the relevant DNA sequence 
by severing chemical bonds produced a non-natural, patent-eligible molecule.60  
 The Myriad case and its varying judicial conclusions make abundantly clear the 
complicated, subjective, and even philosophical nature of the judicial exceptions and subject 
matter eligibility. 61  The fact that the Federal Circuit judges—who are experts in the field of patent 
 
53 Id. at 1378 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (“What is claimed in the BRCA genes is the genetic coding material, and that 
material is the same, structurally and functionally, in both the native gene and the isolated form of the gene.”). 
54 Id. at 1380 (“[T]he PTO’s practice and guidelines are not entitled to significant weight, for . . . the PTO lacks 
substantive rulemaking authority as to issues such as patentability.”). 
55 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Nonetheless, it is 
important to consider the effects of such broad patent claims on the biotechnology field.”). 
56 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 566 U.S. 902 (2012). 
57 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The remand of this case for 
consideration in light of Mayo might suggest . . . that the composition claims are mere reflections of a law of nature. 
Respectfully, they are not, any more than any product of man reflects and is consistent with a law of nature.”). 
58 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 587–89 (2013). 
59 Id. at 596. 
60 Id. at 593. 
61 BRIAN CASSIDY, Analysis: Patent Subject-matter Eligibility – A Widening Gap, BLOOMBERG LAW ANALYSIS (April 
18, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-patent-subject-matter-eligibility-a-
widening-gap (“The issue of subject matter eligibility is complex and somewhat philosophical by nature.”). 
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law—reached identical conclusions both before and after applying the Alice/Mayo test illustrates 
one of the challenges, or even the futility, of the judicially crafted doctrine. 62  The test also fails 
to provide effective guidance as to what constitutes an abstract idea or inventive concept that 
adequately incorporates a judicial exception in a manner worthy of patentability.63  Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court’s emphasis on conventionality when searching for an inventive concept appears 
to conflate subject matter eligibility with other sections of the Patent Act, namely novelty and 
nonobviousness under sections 102 and 103 respectively, which the Court has explicitly warned 
against.64  The Court’s contradiction of its own precedent, apparent misunderstanding of patent 
doctrine, and minimal guidance has set the stage for far reaching implications. 
 Most importantly, the varied applications of the Alice/Mayo test and the ensuing 
uncertainty and unpredictability disincentivizes innovation by weakening patent protection.65  Not 
only are inventors less likely to expend the resources necessary to develop novel technology when 
their discoveries may ultimately be vulnerable to theft, directly impacting innovation, but investors 
are also less likely to finance such endeavors.66  This can negatively impact our nation’s economy 
by deterring domestic investment,67 especially with the vital role tech startups have in our modern, 
technologically dependent society.68  In conjunction with the economic effects, the current discord 
also implicates national security, given the major role computer science innovations play in the 
 
62 Compare Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1352–53 (Fed. Cir. 2011), with 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
63 See USPTO 2019 Guidance, supra note 29, at 50.  
64 Did the Supreme Court Destroy Patents, supra note 5. 
65 See Press Release, Tillis and Coons: What We Learned At Patent Reform Hearings (Jun. 24, 2019), 
https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/6/tillis-and-coons-what-we-learned-at-patent-reform-hearings (discussing the 
negative impact the current lack of clarity and certainty with respect to patent eligibility has had on research and 
investment in areas like medical diagnostics and artificial intelligence). 
66 See Borella, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (“[S]tudies show[] that investors familiar with the current 
lack of clarity invest less in critical research and development in areas like medical diagnostics and artificial 
intelligence, at least in the Unites States.”).  
67 Id. 
68 See Did the Supreme Court Destroy Patents, supra note 5 (discussing the major implications of the current subject 
matter eligibility disarray on high-tech startups).  
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current technological arms race between our nation and other technologically advanced countries 
like China.69  
But what is perhaps the most concerning aspect of these issues is the Supreme Court’s 
apparent satisfaction with the current state of subject matter eligibility70 and incompetence in 
effectively crafting patent doctrine.71  The Patent Office’s recent guidance and the recent draft bill 
to reform section 101, both of which will be discussed below, reflect the growing concern and 
destabilization surrounding the Alice and Mayo decisions. 72  While congressional action may be a 
step towards fixing the current disarray, it may not have as large an impact on overall patentability 
as proponents of the reform may hope.  
III. Recent United States Patent and Trademark Office Effort to Clarify Alice/Mayo 
 The Alice/Mayo test has confused those involved at nearly every step of the patent 
process.73  As the agency responsible for issuing patents, the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office recently sought to clarify the analysis by revising the patent examiners application of the 
Alice/Mayo test in two ways. 74  First, the PTO enumerates categories of abstract ideas.75  Second, 
it attempts to clarify the first step of the Alice/Mayo analysis by defining what it means for a claim 
 
69 See id.  (“It is because of the Supreme Court that investors interested in artificial intelligence are taking their money 
to China and funding startups there.”); Clark, supra note 4 (discussing China’s alleged theft of intellectual property 
and technology); Rosie Perper, Huawei Slams Trump’s ‘Unreasonable’ Ban, Saying That the Move Will Only Harm 
US Interests in Its Own 5G Rollout, Business Insider (May 16, 2019, 12:06 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/huawei-responds-trump-china-tech-national-emergency-ban-2019-5?r=cold 
(discussing the potential security risk with a Chinese company’s 5G technology serving as a backdoor for espionage). 
70 See Press Release, Tillis and Coons: What We Learned At Patent Reform Hearing (Jun. 24, 2019), 
https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/6/tillis-and-coons-what-we-learned-at-patent-reform-hearings (noting “the 
Supreme Court’s denying over 40 petitions for certiorari on this topic since its disruptive decision in the Alice case 
five years ago”). 
71 See Did the Supreme Court Destroy Patents, supra note 5 (describing the Supreme Court as incapable of forming 
patent policy). 
72 See USPTO 2019 Guidance, supra note 29, at 50; Tillis Draft Bill, supra note 4. 
73 See Press Release, Tillis and Coons: What We Learned At Patent Reform Hearings, supra note 37 (noting that 
inventors, the USPTO, and judges alike have struggled to determine what is subject matter eligible). 
74 USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 50.  
75 USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 50. 
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to be “directed to” a judicial exception.76 But while the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter 
Eligibility Guidance (hereinafter “the Guidance”) reflects a valiant effort to bring stability to the 
current state of affairs, it has failed to meaningfully influence the courts.77  
A. Categorizing Abstract Ideas 
 The first way in which the Guidance seeks to promote consistent application of the 
Alice/Mayo test pertains to the determination of whether the claims recite a judicial exception, 
specifically in regards to abstract ideas.78  Since the inception of the Alice/Mayo test the Federal 
Circuit has issued a growing number of decisions identifying abstract and non-abstract subject 
matter.79  Many of these decisions, however, reach differing conclusions with respect to similar 
subject matter, which makes drawing the line between abstract and non-abstract a significant 
challenge.80  The Guidance seeks to clarify what constitutes an abstract idea by explicitly 
enumerating three new groupings of subject matter that fall within the abstract idea exception.81  
These general groupings include mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human 
activity, and mental processes or concepts carried out in the human mind.82  The Guidance provides 
specific examples of each from the case law and up to this point, provides a theoretically effective 
method for consistently identifying abstract ideas.83  But, the determination of abstract idea does 
not end there. 
 
76 USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 50. 
77 See, e.g., Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 760 Fed. Appx. 1013, 1021 (Fed. Cir. April 1, 
2019) (refusing to defer to the Guidance); ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., No. 2018-1739, 2019 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 1919, at *9 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 28, 2019) (refusing to defer to the Guidance categorization of abstract ideas). 
78 USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 50. 
79 USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 52. 
80 USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 52. 
81 USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 51–53. 
82 USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 51–53. 
83 USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 51–53. 
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The Guidance also establishes a procedure for determining whether subject matter that does 
not fall neatly within one of these categories should nonetheless be treated as an abstract idea.84  
This procedure essentially entails treating the “tentative abstract idea” as if it were a judicial 
exception and proceeding with the Alice/Mayo analysis to determine whether the additional 
elements provide the requisite inventive concept.85  If the answer to that question is yes, the 
determination of whether the subject matter is abstract is irrelevant and the subject matter is 
eligible.86  If the answer is no, however, then the examiner is told to notify the Technology Center 
Director, who must then record and provide justification for any claim limitation they determine 
recites an abstract idea.87  This is where the potential benefit of consistency comes into question.  
By leaving the determination of tentative abstract ideas up to the director, who can easily come to 
a different conclusion than a judge, this portion of the revision does little more than provide a 
consolidated list of abstract ideas enunciated in the case law, which examiners already consider.88  
But this is not to say that the principle underlying the procedure is unsound.  The second opinion, 
recording, and justification procedure may very well promote consistency within the PTO.  Rather, 
the issue is with the PTO’s limited authority and the inherently complicated, and to some extent, 
subjective flaws of the judicially created abstract idea exception.89  
B. Determining Whether A Claim Is “Directed To” A Judicial Exception 
The second way in which the Guidance revises the examiners application of the 
Alice/Mayo test pertains to the first step of the test: determining whether a claim is “directed to” a 
 
84 USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 52–53. 
85 USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 57. 
86 USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 57. 
87 USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 57. 
88 USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 51 (discussing the previous practice of “describing the subject matter claimed 
in the patent in suit and noting whether or not certain subject matter has been identified as an abstract idea” in previous 
Federal Circuit decision). 
89 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (using judicial reasoning to establish the policy that “laws of 
nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas” should not be patentable). 
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judicial exception.90  The Guidance teaches that if the claim, in its entirety, integrates the recited 
exception into a practical application then it is not directed to that judicial exception.91  The 
Guidance further explains that “a claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical 
application will apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful 
limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to 
monopolize the judicial exception.”92  Here, the PTO attempts to cater to the Supreme Court’s 
“inventive concept” principle exemplified in Mayo.93  While the guidance does not purport to 
change the second “inventive concept” step of the Alice/Mayo analysis, it does explicitly note that 
the conventionality of additional elements should only impact analysis under this second step.94  
In theory, excluding questions of conventionality from the first step should result in fewer claims 
reaching the inventive concept step by lowering the bar for determining whether a claim adequately 
integrates a judicial exception.  This interpretation, however, is misleading because sufficient 
integration is admittedly dependent on the inclusion of a “meaningful limit on the judicial 
exception” so that the claim does not monopolize the judicial exception.95  Again, the Guidance 
does nothing more than cite specific examples from case law where such a “meaningful limit” was 
found or absent.96  Nor does the Guidance address the question of whether conventionality should 
play a role in subject matter eligibility at all, given the role conventional or routine steps have with 
 
90 USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 50. 
91 USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 53. 
92 USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 53. 
93 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–73 (2012) (“[A] process that focuses 
upon the use of a natural law [must] also contain other elements or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to 
as an "inventive concept," sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent 
upon the natural law itself.”). 
94 USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 55. 
95 USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 53. 
96 USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 55. 
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respect to the requirements of novelty and nonobviousness.97  That being said, the PTO cannot be 
blamed for the practical limitations of the Guidance or for overlooking this flaw when taking into 
account their duty to follow policy, rather than craft it. 
C. The Guidance’s Impact on the Courts 
Ultimately, the Guidance effectively reflects the PTO’s attempts to use what little direction 
the judicial precedent has provided for the complicated, and somewhat subjective, application of 
the Alice/Mayo test.  Perhaps this lack of direction is why the Guidance fails to elaborate on the 
inventive concept step of the analysis.  Or, perhaps, guidance on the inherently subjective and 
flawed notion of an inventive concept is itself impossible.  In fact, the inventive concept 
requirement can be seen as akin to the “flash of creative genius” test98 that was used to determine 
obviousness until it was finally overridden by Congress.99 
 While the Guidance suffers from the aforementioned limitations on its practical utility, it 
also bears a more fundamental flaw that indicates the need for congressional intervention in the 
field.  Namely, the futility of the PTO’s effort to clarify the current state of subject matter eligibility 
is most apparent when looking at the impact, or lack thereof, the Guidance has had on the courts.  
The Guidance admits its lack of binding authority on the courts, given that it is not law but rather 
a guide for patent examiners and administrative judges at the PTO.100  Recent Federal Circuit 
 
97 See Did the Supreme Court Destroy Patents, supra note 5 (discussing the Supreme Courts conflation of novelty and 
obviousness in Mayo); QUINN, It May Be Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit, supra note 13 (characterizing Mayo as 
a case “with an exceptionally poor claim where the Supreme Court took a shortcut using 101 instead of using 102 or 
103”).    
98 See Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941) (“[T]he new device, however 
useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative genius, not merely the skill of the calling.”). The “flash of creative 
genius” test was essentially a subjective analysis of whether the invention met a level of ingenuity that warranted 
patentability. 
99 Gene Quinn, The Hunt for the Inventive Concept is the Flash of Creative Genius Test by Another Name, IP Watchdog 
(Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/11/06/hunt-inventive-concept-flash-creative-genius/id=103092/. 
100 USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 51. 
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decisions have exposed this lack of binding authority and shown the potential for different results 
when applying the Guidance as compared to judicial review. 101  
In Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC (Cleveland Clinic II), the 
Federal Circuit addressed the subject matter eligibility of a method for identifying an elevated level 
of myeloperoxidase (MPO), a biomarker for increased risk of cardiovascular disease, in human 
plasma.102  The steps to the method involved collecting a sample, probing the sample with an 
antibody, detecting the biomarker levels, and comparing these with healthy reference samples.103  
In finding the patent invalid as directed to the natural correlation between MPO levels and 
cardiovascular disease, the court explicitly declined to defer to the Guidance.104  Under the 
Guidance it would have been reasonable to end the Alice/Mayo analysis at step one.  The method 
steps essentially applied well-understood techniques, such as anti-body probing and detection, to 
elevated biomarker levels limited in use to determining a patient’s cardiovascular risk.105  In other 
words, the claim effectively integrated the judicial exception into a practical application while 
imparting the arguably meaningful limit of use in determining cardiovascular risk.106  
ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc. also exemplifies the Federal Circuit’s reluctance 
to follow the Guidance, but with respect to the enumerated abstract idea categories.107  The patent 
at issue in ChargePoint was an apparatus that allowed for remote control of vehicle charging 
 
101 BRIAN CASSIDY, Analysis: Patent Subject-matter Eligibility – A Widening Gap, BLOOMBERG LAW ANALYSIS (April 
18, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-patent-subject-matter-eligibility-a-
widening-gap (“The issue of subject matter eligibility is complex and somewhat philosophical by nature.”); see 
Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 760 Fed. Appx. 1013, 1016 (Fed. Cir. April 1, 2019); 
ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., No. 2018-1739, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 1919 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 28, 2019). 
102 Cleveland Clinic, 760 Fed. Appx. At 1016. 
103 Id. at 1016–17. 
104 Id. at 1021. 
105 Id. at 1016–17. 
106 Id. 
107 ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., No. 2018-1739, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 1919 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 28, 2019). 
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stations.108  The court found that the claim involved “the abstract idea of communicating requests 
to a remote server and receiving communication from that server.”109  In finding that the claim was 
directed to this abstract idea the court highlighted the fact that the invention appears to do nothing 
more than apply the concept of network-communication in the setting of electrical vehicle 
charging, despite being limited to the context of vehicle charging.110  The invention in ChargePoint 
was an apparatus, a physical object, and as such does not fit intuitively into the category of 
mathematical concept, an organization of human activity, or a mental process, as the Guidance 
would require.111  
These cases represent two of the many instances where the courts and the PTO have 
struggled with modern subject matter eligibility doctrine.112  Ultimately, the courts’ reluctance to 
follow the Guidance can be seen as a result of its lack of binding authority on the courts.113  But 
there may be a deeper issue at play, one relating to interpretation.  After all, the courts could have 
applied the Guidance’s analysis if they determined it was appropriate.  Perhaps the courts simply 
disagree with the PTO in regard to its interpretation of the current subject matter jurisprudence.  
While purporting to follow judicial precedent, the Guidance could be viewed as actually expanding 
the bounds of the Alice/Mayo test,114 providing further reason for the courts’ lack of deference.  
Or perhaps the Federal Circuit feels straight-jacketed by Supreme Court precedent and chooses to 
 
108 Id. at *9–10. 
109 Id. at *10. 
110 Id. at *15. 
111 Id. at *9. 
112 See, e.g., Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (applying the 
Alice/Mayo test to invalidate a patent issued by the PTO on a method for prenatal diagnosis of certain fetal 
characteristics utilizing a newly discovered form of DNA); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 
569 U.S. 576, 596 (2013) (reversing the Federal Circuit’s finding of subject matter eligibility both before and after 
remand of the case for consideration in light of the Alice/Mayo test.). 
113 USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 51. 
114 See USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 52–53 (limiting the finding of an abstract idea to enumerate categories, 
except in rare cases, theoretically reducing the chances of finding a claim directed to an abstract idea). 
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apply the Alice/Mayo test broadly out of fear of being overruled once again,115 despite their 
disagreement with the test in at least some cases.116  The Guidance’s failure illustrates the 
Alice/Mayo test’s tendency to produce inconsistent results, as well as the PTO’s inability to stifle 
the current subject matter eligibility chaos.  In fact, the Guidance’s failure can even be viewed as 
a cry for help when considering the PTO’s self-recognition of their limited authority.  Congress 
has heard this cry and now seeks to address it.117  
IV. Congressional Reform of Section 101 
 While the PTO may lack the power required to influence the courts position on subject 
matter eligibility, Congress has the power to enact legislation that even the Supreme Court, 
arguably, must follow.  Inventors, PTO officials, Federal Circuit Judges, investors, scholars, 
business leaders, trade groups, and patient advocates have voiced growing concerns about the last 
decade of Alice/Mayo decisions and evinced the need for congressional intervention;118 And 
Congress has answered the call.119  In May 2019, Senator Thom Tillis (R-N.C.), chairman of the 
Senate Judiciary subcommittee on intellectual property, released a draft bill that would reform 
section 101 of the Patent Act.120  While still in its infancy, the draft bill makes a number of 
seemingly drastic modifications to section 101,121 each of which will be analyzed below.  
 
 
115 See QUINN, It May Be Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit, supra note 13 (suggesting the Federal Circuit has 
expansively interpreted the Alice/Mayo precedent out of fear of being overturned). 
116 See, e.g., Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Linn, J., concurring) 
(discussing the consequences of Mayo’s “broad language in excluding a meritorious invention from the patent 
protection it deserves and should have been entitled to retain”); id. (“But for the sweeping language in the Supreme 
Court’s Mayo opinion, I see no reason, in policy or statute, why this breakthrough invention should be deemed patent 
ineligible.”). 
117 What We Learned at Patent Reform Hearings, supra note 3 (“The hearings reinforced what we have been hearing 
for years—the U.S. patent system with regard to patent eligibility is broken and desperately needs to be repaired.”). 
118 What We Learned at Patent Reform Hearings, supra note 3. 
119 See Tillis Draft Bill, supra note 4. 
120 Tillis Draft Bill, supra note 4. 
121 See Tillis Draft Bill, supra note 4 (abrogating and rejecting the use of any “implicit or other judicially created 
exceptions . . . and all cases establishing or interpreting those exceptions”).  
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A. Splitting Section 101 
First, the draft bill splits section 101 into two sections.122  Draft section B states that 
“eligibility under this section shall be determined only while considering the claimed invention as 
a whole, without discounting or disregarding any claim limitation.”123  This is a relatively straight 
forward section that simply reaffirms the importance of viewing a claim in its entirety, rather than 
focusing on any particular limitation, and should have minimal practical effect since step two of 
the Alice/Mayo analysis already considers the claim as whole.124  Rather, this is likely to serve a 
supporting role for the other reform provisions. 
Reformed section 101 also reflects a subtle change to the statute’s otherwise untouched 
language.  Reformed section 101 removes the term “new” from the phrase “new and useful” 
employed in the current version of section 101.125  While this may be to resolve the apparent 
redundancy of the term “new” in section 101, given that section 102 is dedicated entirely to 
novelty, it may also reflect congressional intent to do more than fix a simple drafting 
redundancy.126  This intent is especially apparent, as illustrated below, when investigating the 
underlying rationale for the more radical changes proposed in the draft bill. 
B. Abrogating the Judicial Exceptions to Subject Matter Eligibility 
The first of the more substantive reform provisions states that “no implicit or other 
judicially created exceptions to subject matter eligibility, including ‘abstract ideas,’ ‘laws of 
nature,’ or ‘natural phenomena,’ shall be used to determine patent eligibility under section 101, 
and all cases establishing or interpreting those exceptions to eligibility are hereby abrogated.”127  
 
122 Tillis Draft Bill, supra note 4. 
123 Tillis Draft Bill, supra note 4. 
124 See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[I]f the answer is yes, then 
we next consider the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination.’”). 
125 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952), with Tillis Draft Bill, supra note 4. 
126 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 101, with 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
127 Tillis Draft Bill, supra note 4. 
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This facially radical section makes clear Congress’s disapproval of the “federal common law of 
patents” relating to subject matter eligibility exceptions and overrules the Alice/Mayo line of 
cases.128  
Initially, the Supreme Court will likely be concerned with such a drastic alteration of 
section 101 doctrine.  After all, the judicial exceptions appear to play an integral role in the overall 
purpose of patent law by preventing monopolization of the “building blocks of human 
ingenuity.”129  Given the Court’s emphasis on preemption, it would not be surprising if the Court 
deemed this provision unconstitutional by hindering the advancement of the useful arts.130  This 
may be true even with the Court’s apparent, yet ironic recognition that it is Congress’s  
responsibility to create new laws.131 But, the Court’s track record of respecting congressional intent 
in the field of patent law132 and the Court’s apparent restraint with respect to recent opportunities 
to engage in judicial activism may suggest otherwise.133  Furthermore, this modification to section 
101 is less concerning when considering Congress’s potential motives for such a facially radical 
change.  
Perhaps Congress is merely rejecting the Court’s opinion that other sections of the patent 
act cannot adequately supplant section 101 in preventing the patenting of natural laws, phenomena, 
 
128 See Guttag, supra note 23 (discussing the Supreme Courts history of judicial activism in the field of patent law). 
129 See Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1381 (“[P]atent claims should not prevent the use of the basic building blocks of 
technology—abstract ideas, naturally occurring phenomena, and laws of nature.”). 
130 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (describing the concern justifying judicial 
exceptions as one of pre-emption). 
131 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 92 (2012) (recognizing Congress’ role in 
crafting laws when necessary, but ironically going on to establish the Alice/Mayo test despite the complete absence 
of any mention of abstract ideas or laws of nature in the text of section 101). 
132 See, e.g., Graham v. John Deer Co., 383 U.S. 1, 15 (1966) (“It also seems apparent that Congress intended by the 
last sentence of § 103 to abolish the test it believe[s] this Court announced in the controversial phrase “flash of creative 
genius.”). 
133 See Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 528 (2019) (en banc) (“The act does not 
contain a ‘wholly groundless’ exception, and we are not at liberty to rewrite the statute passed by Congress and signed 
by the president.”); See also Robert Isackson, A New Court and a New Fix for Alice and Patent Eligibility under 
Section 101, IP WATCHDOG (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/01/11/new-court-fix-alice-patent-
eligibility-judicial-exceptions-101/id=104975/. 
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and abstract ideas.134  In Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., the Court faced this 
argument and rejected it solely on the grounds that it would effectively destroy the judicial 
exceptions and conflict with prior law.135  In support of its rejection the Court offered only 
conclusory statements that the other sections are not equipped to handle this role and relying on 
them would increase the risk of uncertainty.136  But this view is undermined by the Court’s own 
conflation of sections 102 and 103 with 101 in the Alice/Mayo test, which suggests that 
requirements such as novelty and obviousness may already be supplanting the judicial exceptions, 
albeit under the guise of section 101.137  Further evidence of Congress’s disapproval of the Court’s 
conflation of the different patentability requirements can be found in the next reform provision. 
C. The Role of Conventionality  
Similar to the Guidance, the next provision of the Tillis Draft Bill states that the 
determination of subject matter eligibility should not depend at all on the manner in which an 
invention is made, whether individual limitations are well-known, conventional or routine, or “any 
other considerations relating to sections 102, 103, or 112 of this title.”138  Aside from explicitly 
abrogating the use of conventionality in subject matter eligibility analysis, this provision makes 
explicit Congress’s condemnation of the Court’s conflation of sections 101, 102, 103, and 112.139  
By explicitly and broadly excluding the use of any considerations relating to novelty, obviousness, 
 
134 See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90 (rejecting the government’s contention that sections 102, 103, and 112 can perform the 
screening function currently achieved by judicial exceptions). But See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (“The 
obligation to determine what type of discovery is sought to be patented must preceded the determination of whether 
that discovery is, in fact, new or obvious.”). 
135 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90. 
136 Id. 
137 Did the Supreme Court Destroy Patents, supra note 5; See QUINN, It May Be Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit, 
supra note 13 (“After all, Mayo dealt with an exceptionally poor claim where the Supreme Court took a shortcut using 
101 instead of 102 or 103.”). 
138 Compare USPTO 2019 Guidance, supra note 29, at 51 (teaching that conventionality should only be a factor at 
step two of the Alice/Mayo analysis), with Tillis Draft Bill, supra note 4 (stating that subject matter eligibility should 
never depend on conventionality). 
139 Tillis Draft Bill, supra note 4. 
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or written description, this provision further reflects Congress’ view that these other sections of 
the Patent Act can effectively replace the judicial exceptions.140  
D. Reformed Section 101 Favoring Eligibility 
The third and final provision of the draft bill best represents what Congress views as section 
101’s role in determining patentability in general and simply states that “section 101 shall be 
construed in favor of eligibility.”141  This relatively straight-forward provision ties together the 
proposed provisions analyzed above.  Supported by the other aspects of the reform, this provision 
clearly reflects Congress’s dissatisfaction with the rampant use of section 101 as a bar to patent 
protection for recent advancements in the fields of computer science and biotechnology;142 
accordingly, it appears Congress intends to return section 101 to its previous status as a relatively 
minimal hurdle to patentability.143  
On its face, the Tillis Draft Bill appears to reflect Congress’s intent to promote innovation 
by redressing one of the Supreme Court’s recent blows to eligibility and redirecting the current 
paradigm of patent law towards one favoring patentability.144  It must be noted, however, that 
while many have voiced valid concerns with the current subject matter paradigm, others fear that 
 
140 But see Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90 (“[T]o shift the patent eligibility inquiry entirely to these later sections risks creating 
significantly greater legal uncertainty, while assuming that those sections can do work that they are not equipped to 
do.”). 
141 Tillis Draft Bill, supra note 4. 
142 See JOHN M. GOLDEN ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, at 65 (Robert C. Clark et al. 
eds., 7th ed. 2018) (“Questions of . . . subject-matter eligibility have proven particularly significant for the patenting 
of biochemical substances, computer software, and business methods.”); QUINN, It May Be Time to Abolish the 
Federal Circuit, supra note 9 (discussing the Federal Circuit’s rejection of 90% or more of the software patents and 
nearly all of the diagnostic patents on the basis of subject matter eligibility since Alice/Mayo). 
143 JOHN M. GOLDEN ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 65 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 7th 
ed. 2018). 
144 Compare Samuel F. Ernst, A Patent Reformist Supreme Court and Its Unearthed Precedent, 29 FORDHAM 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, MEDIA AND ENTERTAINMENT L. J. 1, 1 (2019) (discussing the Supreme Court’s “new era 
of common law patent reform in favor of accused infringers), and Did the Supreme Court Destroy Patents, supra note 
5, with Daniel T. Taskalos, Returning to the Status Quo? – Proposed Outline for Section 101 Reform, THE NAT’L L. 
REV. (2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/returning-to-status-quo-proposed-outline-section-101-reform 
(discussing the draft bill as returning section 101 to its previous status as “a low hurdle to patentability, but a hurdle 
nonetheless”). 
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overhauling the current doctrine, specifically the Alice/Mayo test, will negatively impact 
innovation by arming “patent trolls.”145  An investigation into the interplay of patent trolls and the 
Alice/Mayo test is beyond the scope of this comment. It is worth noting, however, that the threat 
of patent trolls must be weighed against the danger of disincentivizing innovation more generally, 
because too much restriction will upset the balance patent law seeks to promote.  Even though the 
Alice/Mayo test has been effective in combating this issue by, for instance, barring the protection 
of most software claims,146 it has done so in an overly inclusive manner and other methods for 
controlling trolls may be available.  In sum, the draft bill represents a step in the right direction, 
but it still carries with it the inescapable, yet mitigatable, issues stemming from judicial 
interpretation.  Congress should take this “blank slate” opportunity to prospectively bolster the 
predictability of section 101 by implementing further changes beyond those already proposed in 
the draft bill. 
V. The Possible Outcome of the Section 101 Reform 
While the reformed section 101 may appear to be a direct solution to the unpredictability 
created by the Alice/Mayo test, it is unlikely to produce as radical a change in overall patentability 
as the language of the reformed statute suggests.  This is for two reasons, both of which will be 
discussed in further detail below.  First, the Court may use judicial review to simply find the reform 
unconstitutional; however, there are ways for Congress to mitigate the risk of judicial review.  The 
second and more complex reason involves the Court simply moving the judicial exceptions to 
another section of the Patent Act.  In other words, even if the section 101 reform is unchallenged, 
 
145 A Terrible Patent Bill Is On the Way, Electronic Frontier Foundation (May 29. 2019), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/05/terrible-patent-bill-way; See Patent Trolls, Electronic Frontier Foundation 
(describing patent trolls as entities that purchase or possess patents for the sole monetary purpose of forcing others 
using their protected technology to enter into license agreements or face the risk of costly litigation). 
146 See QUINN, It May Be Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit, supra note 13 (noting the Federal Circuit’s invalidation 
of “90% or more of the software patents they see”). 
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the Court may formulate new doctrine serving the same purpose of the judicial exceptions under a 
different section of the patent act, with 103 regarding obviousness being the likely candidate for 
reasons discussed below.147  But that does not make the reform a wasted effort; rather, the Supreme 
Court and Federal Circuit can and should use this fresh start as an opportunity to consider the 
issues evinced by the Alice/Mayo test when crafting future doctrine.  
While congress may reform section 101 and rely on its constitutional supremacy, it would 
be wise for Congress to safeguard such reform efforts from the interpretive pitfalls present in the 
current paradigm.148  In order to do so, Congress must recognize the interpretive pitfalls of the 
draft bill and account for the Court’s potential response to the new legislation.149  
A. How Congress Should Bolster the Reform 
Interpretation plays a vital role in the creation of any judicially created doctrine.  For 
example, the judicial exceptions themselves can be seen as the product of the Court’s interpretation 
of section 101 in light of the constitutional goal of patent law.  In other words, the Court’s 
contention that abstract ideas, natural laws, and phenomena should not be patent eligible can 
rationally be viewed as supporting the constitutional goal of promoting the useful arts by 
preventing expansive restrictions on innovation.150  While congress may reform section 101 and 
rely on its constitutional supremacy, it would be wise to safeguard such reform efforts against 
misinterpretation.151  
 
147 See discussion infra Section IV.B. 
148 See MARK MARELLO, Urge the Drafters of the New Section 101 to Support Inventor-Friendly reform, IP 
WATCHDOG (May 13, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/05/13/urge-drafters-new-section-101-support-
inventor-friendly-reform/id=109206/ (discussing the need to account for the  courts “damage factor” when reforming 
section 101 “because whatever language you think is well-written, the courts’ will interpret it in flawed or outright 
wrong ways”). 
149 See id. 
150 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 92 (2012). 
151 See MARK MARELLO, Urge the Drafters of the New Section 101 to Support Inventor-Friendly reform, IP 
WATCHDOG (May 13, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/05/13/urge-drafters-new-section-101-support-
inventor-friendly-reform/id=109206/ (discussing the need to account for the  courts “damage factor” when reforming 
 26 
One obvious way in which Congress can mitigate the risk of misinterpretation involves 
making their intentions as clear as possible.  Without such intentions the courts may find it hard to 
justify the facially radical proposal to completely abrogate the judicial exceptions.152  After all, 
logic would dictate that one of the most direct ways to address interpretive issues associated with 
any law or policy entails conveying the legislature’s intent in the most explicit and concrete 
manner.  Reformed section 101 clearly rejects conflation of the various patentability requirements, 
but it does not directly address the valid concerns related to the complete abrogation of the judicial 
exceptions.153  In other words, reformed section 101 can be plausibly read as allowing the patenting 
of former judicial exceptions.  If Congress intends for the other patentability requirements to 
address the risks previously mitigated by the judicial exceptions, as reformed section 101 seems 
to suggest, it should explicitly state that intent as it has with the assumption in favor of eligibility.154  
Furthermore, this would promote consistent application of section 101 and stifle concerns 
associated with the complete abrogation of the judicial exceptions, regardless of whether the other 
patentability requirements can, in fact, replace the exceptions.  This is because if Congress makes 
this decision, the courts might feel less responsible for making the complex and somewhat 
speculative determination of whether or not removal of the judicial exceptions actually promotes 
innovation in a manner consistent with the Constitution.  But Congress may also preempt the 
danger of judicial review by supporting its decision with evidence, or at least a logical foundation, 
in addition to explicitly voicing its intentions. 
 
section 101 “because whatever language you think is well-written, the courts’ will interpret it in flawed or outright 
wrong ways”). 
152 Tillis Draft Bill, supra note 4. 
153 Tillis Draft Bill, supra note 4. 
154 See Tillis Draft Bill, supra note 4 (“section 101 shall be construed in favor of eligibility”). 
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Explicit congressional intent may not completely foreclose the Court from viewing 
reformed section 101 as conflicting with the Constitution, and thereby refusing to recognize the 
new provisions.  Judicial review merely requires finding that “a law be in opposition with the 
Constitution.”155  Providing explicit evidence of congressional intent may play a role in 
determining whether a law is contrary to the Constitution, given the Court’s alleged deference to 
Congress as the governmental entity best equipped for crafting law.156  But intent alone may not 
prevent a judicial determination that reformed section 101 conflicts with the Constitution.  This is 
because the statutes actual impact on overall innovation is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately 
predict.157  While it may be overkill, Congress should also provide evidence, or at least a rational 
argument, as to why such judicial exceptions are unnecessary under section 101, or even contrary 
to the goal of the Constitution.  If Congress explicitly voices its belief that abrogation of the judicial 
exceptions will not impede innovation, nor conflict with the Constitution, and supports this belief 
with a reasonable basis or, better yet, statistical evidence, it would be even more difficult for the 
courts to find a legitimate conflict between the statute and the Constitution.158  Put another way, 
providing a logical foundation supporting the reformed section 101 should preempt the courts from 




155 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803) (“So if a law be in opposition to the Constitution; . . . [T]he court 
must decide which of these conflicting rules governs the case.”) (emphasis added). 
156 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 92 (2012) (“We must recognize the role of 
Congress in crafting more finely tailored rules where necessary.”). 
157 See Joseph Saltiel, In the Courts: Five years After Alice – Five Lessons Learned from the Treatment of Software 
Patents in Litigation, WIPO: WIPO MAGAZINE (August 2019), 
https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2019/04/article_0006.html (“Until a new law is passed and used in litigation 
cases, it will be difficult to gauge the impact of that new legislation.”). 
158 See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178 (requiring that a law conflict with the Constitution prior to engaging in judicial review). 
159 Id. 
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B. The Collateral Effects of the Section 101 Reform   
While Congress may reform the statutory language of section 101, the courts, as 
interpreters of the statute, have a corresponding role in controlling the future of subject matter 
eligibility.  If the reform is accepted, any use of judicial exceptions will be explicitly barred from 
the section 101 analysis, and the courts may account for this by moving the exceptions to other 
patentability requirements like novelty and obviousness. 160  But this is not a bad thing.  In fact, 
Congress may have intended this, as reflected by explicitly barring the use of judicial exceptions 
in determining patent eligibility only under section 101.161  After all, the judicial exceptions serve 
an important purpose because broadly patenting natural laws or abstract ideas would contravene 
the constitutional aim of patent law.162  Furthermore, the issues with the Alice/Mayo analysis do 
not stem from its goal of preventing the monopolization of judicial exceptions, which is undeniably 
in accordance with the constitutional goal of patent law;163 rather, the problem with the Alice/Mayo 
test is the interpretive difficulties and uncertainty it introduces to the historically straight-forward 
concept of subject matter eligibility.164  Obviousness, on the other hand, is an inherently subjective 
concept and therefore better suited for the type of analysis the Alice/Mayo test entails.165  
 
160 See Tillis Draft Bill, supra note 4 (abrogating the use of judicial exceptions and prohibiting the conflation of section 
101 with other patentability requirements). 
161 See Tillis Draft Bill, supra note 4 (“No implicit or other judicially created exceptions to subject matter eligibility . 
. . shall be used to determine patent eligibility under section 101.”) (emphasis added). 
162 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013) (“patent protection strikes a 
delicate balance between creating ‘incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery’ and ‘impeding the flow 
of information that might permit, indeed spur, invention.’”). 
163 See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (describing the concern justifying judicial 
exceptions and the Alice/Mayo test as one of pre-emption). 
164 See JOHN M. GOLDEN ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 65 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 
7th ed. 2018) (discussing subject matter eligibility as a historically minimal burden to patentability). 
165 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2011) (requiring that the claimed invention not be “obvious” when viewed in light of 
the prior art, but failing to define what constitutes “obvious”) with Quinn, The Hunt for the Inventive Concept is the 
Flash of Creative Genius Test by Another Name, supra note  99 (relating the inventive concept step of the Alice/Mayo 
test to the subjective “flash of creative genius” test formerly used in the context of obviousness). 
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Section 103 essentially states that an invention is invalid if, in light of the prior art, it would 
be obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art.166  In one sense, all the Alice/Mayo test 
really asks is whether an invention utilizes a judicial exception in such an inventive, or in other 
words nonobvious, way that warrants patent protection.  In fact, all that may really be required to 
re-stabilize section 101 is recognition of the judicial exceptions as “prior art” so they may be used 
to render an invention obvious.  Section 102 of the Patent Act defines prior art for purposes of 
section 102 and 103, with some nuances, as anything previously disclosed in a patent or 
publication, or anything “in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public.”167  It is 
entirely reasonable to view natural laws and phenomena as being in public use or available to the 
public due to their natural existence and discovery.  The same goes for abstract ideas like hedging 
financial risk, given its history of human use.168  
In that case, reformed section 101 would have little practical impact on patentability in 
general, aside from replacing the troublesome Alice/Mayo test with the standard novelty and 
obviousness analyses; and that is precisely how the section 101 reform should be interpreted.  For 
example, cases like Mayo would still come out the same, albeit under section 103 rather than 
section 101.169  In Mayo, the patented claims were ultimately found invalid because the 
conventional steps of the process involved a judicial exception and did not satisfy the inventive 
concept requirement of 101.170  The Court used the words routine and conventional, which 
suggests that these steps would have also been obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the art.171  
 
166 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2011) 
167 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
168 See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (describing hedging, or protecting against risk, as “a fundamental 
economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce” and deeming it an abstract idea). 
169 QUINN, It May Be Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit, supra note 13 (characterizing Mayo as a case “with an 
exceptionally poor claim where the Supreme Court took a shortcut using 101 instead of using 102 or 103”). 
170 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 67 (2012).  
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In other words, the invention would likely have been obvious and invalid under section 103 
anyways.172  
Furthermore, moving the judicial exceptions to the obviousness inquiry would likely have 
little effect on current section 103 doctrine.  This is because the obviousness inquiry intrinsically 
asks whether additional claim elements integrate the exception in a manner justifying patentability, 
similar to the inventive concept found in the Alice/Mayo test.173  But that does not mean that 
section 103 doctrine should not be modified to avoid some of the issues currently associated with 
the Alice/Mayo analysis.  For instance, if Congress concludes that patenting diagnostic tests aligns 
with the constitutional goals of patent law,174 the reform should include an explicit exception for 
these types of discoveries.  But the current version of the reform does not include such language, 
and since the draft bill does not modify or reform section 103, the court’s interpretation of the law 
will control the future of the section.175  That being said, the courts should view the reform as an 
opportunity to “move” the judicial exceptions to section 103 because doing so will solve the 
interpretive issues associated with section 101 and the Alice/Mayo test while minimally impacting 
overall patentability. 
VI. Conclusion 
The recent confusion and discord surrounding patent subject matter eligibility threatens to 
undermine innovation in technological fields vital to modern society.179  Widespread concern and 
 
172 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2011). 
173 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 103 (requiring that the claimed invention, as whole, not be “obvious” when viewed in light 
of the prior art) with Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“A claim that 
recites [a judicial exception] must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort 
designed to monopolize the [judicial exception].”). 
174 See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Linn, J., concurring) (“But 
for the sweeping language in the Supreme Court’s Mayo opinion, I see no reason, in policy or statute, why this 
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175 Tillis Draft Bill, supra note 4. 
179 Tillis Draft Bill, supra note 4. 
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futile attempts to quell the recent chaos have evinced the need for congressional intervention, and 
it appears Congress intends to address the issue.180  An analysis of the proposed section 101 reform 
reveals that it may not produce as radical a change in overall patentability as the language may 
suggest, nor should it.  Instead, the reform provides a much-needed reorganization of the overall 
patent eligibility inquiry and an opportunity for the judiciary to craft more appropriate doctrine 
going forward.  But the hurdle of judicial interpretation is ever present.   
If Congress wishes to effectively promote consistent application of section 101 it must 
bolster the language of its proposed reform to preemptively address the potential for 
misinterpretation.  Doing so requires at least two things.  First, Congress must explicitly state that 
it intends for other requirements of patentability to supplant the judicial exceptions.  Second, it 
must explicitly voice and support its belief that the other requirements of patentability—most 
importantly obviousness—can effectively address the concerns currently addressed by the judicial 
exceptions in a manner consistent with the Constitution.  Accordingly, the future stability of 
section 101, 103, and the field of patent law in general, lies in the hands of both Congress and the 
courts.  
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